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INDIAN ALLIES IN THE ARMIES OF
NEW SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
THOMAS WM. DUNLAY

HISTORIANS OF THE SPANISH BORDERLANDS have usually noted
differences rather than similarities between it and the AngloAmerican frontier. Certainly the two frontiers showed marked disparities. The unified church and mission system prominent in the
Spanish Borderlands was lacking among Anglo-American institutions. The two frontiers also differed in ethnographic composition,
forms of land tenure, and in the degree of governmental control.
The "carefully planned, minutely organized, and regularly oversupervised" Borderlands frontiersman could not act on his own
lights as could the aggressive and individualistic AngloAmerican. l Yet there were areas in which comparisons suggest
themselves, similarities all the more striking because of the obvious differences between the two frontiers.
A particularly noticeable parallel on both frontiers was the use
of Indian military auxiliaries. In spite of the continued enmity that
historians stress regarding Indian-white relations in the United
States, Indians cooperated with the armies of both powers in strikingly similar ways. This recruitment of friendly Indian scouts and
warriors to conquer hostile Indians occurs so frequently on both
frontiers as to suggest the possibility of such a comparison. The
parallels indicate that, despite disparities of population, troop
strength, and technology between the two, there were similarities
in military conditions and in the outlook of Indians and Europeans. On both frontiers, the professional European military, in
spite of their attitude of superiority, accepted the need to seek aid
from the "primitives" they sought to dominate.
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Recent studies of Spanish-Indian relations have greatly facilitated the present work. Max Moorhead, Elizabeth A. H. John,
John Francis Bannon, and Philip Wayne Powell have treated
various aspects of the subject. Oakah L. Jones has examined the
use of Pueblo scouts, guides, and soldiers in New Mexico in the
eighteenth century. These investigations make possible comparisons between the ways in which Indians served on two frontiers. 2
While the policy of employing Indian allies was followed on
both frontiers, differences were also apparent. The numerical odds
favoring the United States against the Indians were far greater
than Spain's tenuous occupation of its Far Northern frontier.
Moreover, the U.S. Army's use of Indian auxiliaries was usually on
a smaller scale and developed more haphazardly and less as a
standardized policy. Little evidence exists tha t the U. S. officer
corps consciously followed Spanish precedents; indeed, they
tended to be contemptuous of Spanish-American military tradition. For that matter, regular U.S. officers were often ignorant of
British and American precedents for such practices in their own
history. 3
As early as the American Revolution, the U.S. Army employed
Indian auxiliaries. But no permanent system for the recruitment of
Indians existed until the Army Act of 1866 provided for the shortterm enlistment of Indian scouts in the regular army. The use of
the word "scout" was significant since it was the army's intention
to employ Indians primarily as trackers and for reconnaissance;
whites commonly acknowledged tha t in these functions Indians
were superior to all but a few whites. The army, however, had to
ask Indians to serve repeatedly as "auxiliaries" or "allies"-that
is, as combat troops. In some campaigns the Indian scouts were
the only troops that could make contact with the enemy, and they
often appeared to be more effective fighters than the regulars.
Some professional soldiers denied that Indians fought better than
whites, but others admired Indian abilities and recruited Indian
allies inlarge numbers. 4
Both Spain and the United States offered rewards to Indians for
their military services, and the Indians often perceived advantages
not apparent to the whites in such service. Spain frequently gave
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Indian leaders military rank and even titles of nobility. Sensing
less acutely the need of allies, the United States gave no higher
military rank than that of first sergeant, even to prominent chiefs.
Both countries allowed Indian allies the use of white military
equipment, including firearms. Spain otherwise denied the use of
firearms to Indians until the late eighteenth century, so this was a
significant concession; the United States had relatively little success in denying Indians access to firearms. 5
Spain recruited auxiliaries through "gifts, privileges, and intimidation." U.S. scouts received the pay of regular enlisted men
($13.00 per month); in some cases this stipend was especially helpful to destitute reservation Indians. For many restricted and
regimented reservation inmates, it was indeed a privilege to be
allowed to travel and carry arms. 6
There were obvious limitations to recruiting by intimidation
since desertion in battle by unwilling allies could mean disaster.
Yet tribes wishing to avoid conflict with whites could be pressured into providing men. In 1561 the alcalde Francisco de Sosa
asked tribes in the vicinity of Nombre de Dios (near Durango) to
provide men to fight the Chichimecas. Like tribes in the United
States at a later date, these Indians protested that this action
would weaken their villages' defenses. Sosa decided to make an example of the recalcitrants, ordering that they be imprisoned,
fined, flogged, and paraded in the streets. 7
United States officers also occasionally used intimidation to
recruit Indians. In 1864 Colonel Kit Carson insisted that the Zunis
and Hopis prove their loyalty by furnishing military assistance
against the Navajos. Colonel Nelson Miles followed a similar
coursewith the Assiniboines in 1879, requiring them to prove they
were not in sympathy with Sitting Bull's Sioux. Carson was
satisfied with the services of his Pueblo allies, but Miles's Assiniboines seem to have avoided combat. Yet such a policy probably
served to drive a wedge between Indian groups. 8
Unlike Spain, which granted its allies exemption from tribute
and services, the United States made few attempts to exploit the
labor and produce of the Indians in the West. Whites desired, instead, to dispossess the Indians of land and resources that white
labor could exploit. Indians in the United States often allied with
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the whites in the hope of improving their standing with the government. Thus, they might secure a reservation in a region acceptable to them, avoiding dispossession and removal to alien places
such as Indian Territory. The Crows and Wyoming Shoshonis
were notably successful in this effort, although still condemned to
reservation life. The agency Sioux who served General George
Crook in 1876 frankly expressed their hope of heading off a "humanitarian" attempt to move them to Indian Territory. Yet the
Pawnees, in spite of their much-appreciated military services,
were persuaded to remove to the Territory, white encroachment
having made life in Nebraska no longer tolerable. 9
In the sixteenth century Francisco de Sosa's Indian neighbors
feared that furnishing the Spaniards with auxiliaries would
weaken their own defenses, and two centuries later the New Mexico Pueblos expressed the same fear, although Spain attempted to
provide military protection for friendly Indians. The United States
also established military posts or placed troops on temporary duty
for the same purpose. In 1864 a company of Nebraska volunteers
protected the Pawnee reservation while the Pawnee Scouts were
fighting the Sioux elsewhere. Camp Brown, Wyoming, later renamed Fort Washakie after the Shoshoni chief, guarded the Wind
River Shoshoni Reservation. 10
The official policy of Spain and the United States was to assimilate the Indians into white, Christian society. Spanish officials
saw military service as one means of accomplishing this end; Indian allies became better acquainted with Europeans and European ways. Oakah L. Jones believes that increased Pueblo-Spanish
association on campaigns helped create a more homogeneous
society in New Mexico, in which Indian pueblos and Spanish
villages increasingly resembled each other, in a society with a
large mestizo element. II
The Bureau of Indian Affairs formulated U.S. Indian policy, but
many officers insisted that military service was the best means of
integrating Indians into white society in a way acceptable to the
Indians, preserving self-respect and easing them into that ordered
existence whites believed to be lacking in tribal life. General
George Crook, firmest believer in Indian scouts, often pointed out
that scout service made an Indian independent of tribal authority.
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He contended that this new life was more attractive to Indians
because as scouts they were treated the same as white soldiers.
Some officers went further than Crook, asserting that the wholesale enlistment of the men of entire tribes was the solution to all
problems of assimilation. 12
Indians did not always view so positively the assimilation process and resulting social conflicts. In the New Mexican pueblos,
military service increased the prestige of war leaders at the expense of traditional chiefs. Arikara and Pawnee chiefs were also
reluctantto have their young men serve as U.S. scouts; in 1870 the
Pawnee chiefs asked their agent to put an end to enlistments
because the young men acquired bad habits and became less
"tractable." Such problems were probably more acute among the
sedentary, farming peoples, with their hierarchical social structure, than among nomadic peoples. 13
Phillip Powell points out that Indians on both frontiers often
found greater rapport with the military than with the religious or
secular agents of white government. Zeal for conversion and assimilation often created barriers to communication and mutual
respect that defeated its own object. While missionaries and Indian agents frequently viewed military activity, even on behalf of
the whites, as detrimental to their purposes, the professional
military naturally regarded such activities and ambitions as commendable if properly channelled. When Spain initiated a policy of
diplomacy and gift-giving with the Chichimecas in the late sixteenth century, the frontier captain Miguel Caldera was one of its
principal agents. Two centuries later Spanish presidios in the
Apache country were the instruments of a like policy. 14
Indians in the United States noted that, while the soldiers might
be strict and demanding, they did not steal the Indians' government annuities. Army officers, Indians argued, were consistent
and straightforward; one knew where one stood with them. The
Apache chief Pedro recalled that when Major George Randall
"promised a thing he did it; when he said a word he meant it." If
such relationships were not universal on either frontier, they were
frequent enough to modify latter-day stereotypes. IS
Whites commonly exploited intertribal animosities to create
Indian-white alliances. In concentrating on Indian-white contact
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and conflict, historians have obscured the fact that Indians were
acted upon by other Indians as well as by whites. The Indians
often saw intertribal relations as more important than contacts
with whites, and alliances with whites often took place because
the latter could protect them from the menace of powerful Indian
enemies.
In many regions sedentary farming tribes were the first allies of
the whites against the nomads. The Pueblos of New Mexico were,
for instance, an indispensable part of the defense of the province in
the eighteenth century; in the next century they were the first allies
of the United States in the same area. On the Great Plains, Pawnees, Caddos, Arikaras, Wichitas, and other farming peoples
became the U.S. Army's scouts against the "wild tribes."16
Once the hostiles were forced to make peace, however, both
Spain and the United States sought alliances with their former
enemies. This policy harnessed the Indians' energies, provided additional inducements to keep the peace, and created a clear line of
distinction between friends and enemies. The problem of distinguishing friends from enemies was a never-ending moral and
practical difficulty for both Spanish and U.S. forces. For example,
Colonel Juan Bautista de Anza, governor of New Mexico from
1777 to 1787, inflicted severe defeats on the Comanches with
Pueblo allies. When the Comanches sought peace, Anza required
them to furnish a contingent to fight with the Spanish against the
Navajos. When the Navajos in turn sought peace, they had to
become allies in Anza's campaign against the Gila Apaches} 7
Various U.S. commanders, often on their own initiative, formed
alliances with former hostiles. When Sioux and Northern Cheyennes surrendered in the winter of 1876-77, Colonel Nelson Miles
immediately put the leading men in uniform to scout for him
against other Sioux and Cheyennes and later against the Nez
Perces. Bannocks whom Miles captured in 1878 (with the help of
the Crows) went with him to the Canadian border the following
year. Also on that expedition were the Northern Cheyennes of Little Wolf, survivors of the desperate flight from Indian Territory to
Montana in 1878. An even stronger advocate of recruiting defeated hostiles was George Crook, who had a decided preference
for turning fellow-tribesmen against the enemy. Ironically, Crook
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and Miles engaged in public dispute over the loyalty of Crook's
Apache scoutS.'8
Such a recruitment policy sometimes resulted in multitribal
forces within which conflicts could arise. The Spanish had trouble
maintaining harmony when Utes, Comanches, Navajos, and
Pueblos served together. The same problem occurred when Crook
brought together Shoshonis, Pawnees, Sioux, Cheyennes, and
Arapahos in late 1876 to campaign against Sioux and Cheyennes.
The first two tribes were enemies of the others, and Pawnees and
Sioux in particular had to be admonished and carefully controlled
to prevent violence. Crook also intended to add Crows to his
forces, but they arrived too late to participate. 19
Inducing Indians to change sides was a long-standing, if intermittent policy of the Spanish authorities. The United States apparently had no such high-level policy, but the field commanders,
like the Spanish, found it useful and even necessary. The differing
attitudes of the higher authorities reflect the greater advantages of
the United States over the Indians and a general difference in attitude toward Indians. Yet the field commanders, judging by their
actions, faced many parallel problems. 20
Both nations found their allies generally loyal. To the whites
"loyalty" meant faithful allegiance, a sign of virtue in the Indians,
and of strong emotional attachment to the whites. To the Indians,
"loyalty" probably meant a pragmatic decision to be on the winning side and a strict construction of one's pledged word. Deser-'
tions sometimes occurred, but Indian allies rarely turned on white
soldiers in battle. In the United States it happened only once, when
Apache scouts fought soldiers on Cibicu Creek in Arizona in
1881. 21

Indian allies did not always accompany regular troops. The
Spanish frequently armed and encouraged friendly tribes to
launch incursions against enemies without direct Spanish aid. The
Comanches and Utes in the eighteenth century required little encouragement to raid the Apaches and Navajos. During their occupation of Louisiana (1763-1803), Spanish authorities urged Sac
and Fox and other tribes to launch simultaneous attacks on the
Osages. Such practices occurred in the United States, though the
matter has received less attention. Before and during the Civil

General George Crook (1876). Nebraska State Historical Society. Courtesy
of author."
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War, Utes were often allowed-even urged-to attack Navajos.
Crook and Miles, campaigning against the Sioux in the 1870s,
were ready to encourage war parties by Crows and Shoshonis to
harass the enemy and obtain information on their location. 22
Since these free-lance allies were not paid, they had to be given
other rewards. The spoils of battle have ever been a major reason
why men go to war, and Indian auxiliaries were allowed their customary loot: horses, weapons, food, and other animals. The Spanish in New Mexico allowed their allies to take captives; these
might be adopted but were often sold to the Spanish settlers as de
facto slaves. The practice persisted under the United States until
the 1860s. Albert Pfeifer, U.S. agent for the Capote Utes, led his
warriors on slaving expeditions in the 1850s. In 1864 Kit Carson
thought Navajo prisoners should be allotted to the Utes for their
services, but his superior, General James Carleton, insisted that all
Navajos go to the Bosque Redondo reservation. Nevertheles~,
Utes sold many Navajos to New Mexicans. It would be hard to determine whether Navajo "servants" of Spaniards fared better than
those at Bosque Redondo. 23
After the Civil War, Indian "slavery" was officially disapproved, although horses were still awarded to scouts for faithful
service. In 1867, the Warm Springs scouts in Oregon expressed,a
strong preference for enslaving their Paiute prisoners rather than
killing them as ordered by General Frederick Steele; they killed
some, reluctantly, but on other occasions evaded the order. As late
as 1877, Nelson Miles urged the Crows to adopt some Sioux and
Cheyennes, who had scouted against their fellow tribesmen and
were fearful of reprisals. The Crows were willing, admitting that
this was one of the reasons they had been fighting. While the prospective adoptees apparently had no objecti?n, the deal fell
through. 24
Indian allies served not only the more obvious military purposes, but also acted as intelligence gatherers and diplomats.
Assigning these duties to Indian allies was common when close ties
of language and culture existed between hostile and friendly
groups. Even when tribes had long been in conflict, intermittent
truces and trade relations often occurred. In 1'781 Pedro Galindo
Navarro thought the Hopis of northern Arizona might be induced
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to move to New Mexico by sending converted Hopis and other
Christian Indians to them. The Indian converts would go to the
Hopis ostensibly to trade, but would propagandize by "subtly confessing among the heathen the felicity they have enjoyed through
having joined our pueblos, where they lack nothing and are
treated with the greatest humanity. . . ." If this mission was
undertaken, however, the Hopis were not sufficiently impressed to
leave their homeland. 25 General Crook was also able to make contact with Crazy Horse in 1877 through the friendly Sioux chiefs
Spotted Tail and Red Cloud, uncles of the hostile leader. Nelson
Miles sent two Chiricahua Apaches with Lieutenant Charles Gatewood to secure Geronimo's surrender in 1886, and Apache
accounts give the two Indians, Kayetah and Martine, greater
prominence than the white officer. 26
Espionage in the classic sense is usually not associated with
Indian wars, but examples occur in the military records of the U.S.
and Spain. Powell notes that Indian converts in the sixteenth century informed missionaries of attempts by rebels to get them to
participate in uprisings. U.S. Army officers, during periods when
they had temporary control of Arizona reservations, employed
"secret scouts" or "confidential Indians" to inform them of
discontent. In the Sioux War of 1876, Crook had Sioux agents, evidently recruited at the agencies, in enemy camps; they brought
him important information about the movements of the hostiles. 27
In New Mexico during the 1700s, Indian auxiliaries sometimes
comprised "75 to 85 per cent of the expeditionary force." This
was not usually the case with major forces in the U.S., although in
Crook's summer and fall campaigns in 1876, Indians made up
about a third of his command. In many smaller affairs Indians
made up 50 percent or more of the U.S. force. Many small patrols
consisted of less than a dozen soldiers and about the same number
of Indians. In 1874 Captain A. E. Bates led 63 troopers, 20 enlisted Shoshoni scouts, and 167 Shoshoni "allies" under Chief
Washakie into battle against Arapaho raiders. The captain was
not wholly satisfied with his allies, but together they inflicted
heavy casualties on the Arapahos. 28 In 1878 Nelson Miles learned
that Bannock fugitives were headed through Yellowstone Park
in his direction. Having only 35 mounted infantry available, he
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asked the Crows for assistance. In spite of misgivings by the Crow
chiefs, 75 warriors, who "were not afraid of anything," followed
him. In a surprise attack, Miles gained 31 prisoners and the Crows
a number of horses. Miles himself remarked that the affair was
more like an Indian war party than a regular army expedition. 29
This action parallels many occasions when Spanish commanders
received orders to deploy a specified number of soldiers and "such
Indian auxiliaries as may appear to be necessary." Miles's action,
and like moves in the same campaign, were emergency improvisations, not matters of well-established policy as with the Spanish.
The U.S. Army seldom officially acknowledged such heavy reliance on Indian allies. 30
In the last Apache campaigns of the 1880s, Crook depended
much more on his scouts than on regular troops. His 1883 expedition into Mexico included 47 cavalry and 193 Apache scouts. In
the Geronimo campaign of 1885-86, Crook judged white troops as
a handicap to the scouts in the rugged Sierra Madre. He thus had
the regulars patrol the border and guard strategic points while the
scouts hunted Geronimo in the Sierra. This action offended many
regulars, and the critics included Philip Sheridan, the commanding general of the army. This circumstance led to Crook's
relief since he would not take responsibility for the campaign
unless allowed to conduct it his way. Subsequent operations under
Nelson Miles showed that regulars could not overtake Apaches
who did not choose to be caught, even if the pursuit was maintained until the troops reached the limit of physical endurance.
The Spanish, never possessing comparable resources, could not
have afforded the luxury of acting as Sheridan did. A century
before the Geronimo campaign, Commandante-General Jacobo
Ugarte had learned that Spanish troops alone could not cope with
Apaches and that Indian auxiliaries "invariably inflicted more
casualties on the Apaches than did the [Spanish] presidiaIs
themselves. "31
Intimately related to their extensive use of Indian manpower-a
necessity in view of the scarcity of Europeans on the northern
frontier-was the Spanish "defensive colonization" of friendly Indians and the movement of Indian settlements for "strategic reasons." These practices made friendly Indians an integral part of
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the system of conquest and defense. Tlaxcalan Indians, Spanish
allies from the days of Cortes, were moved to the northern provinces and served as auxiliary troops and as examples of civilization to the northern tribes. In Arizona and Sonora, the native
Pimas and Opatas were militarized and Christianized, having
been paid and organized according to Spanish military practice.
More than a part of the frontier defense system, they were the
frontier to a great extent in the 1700s. Probably because of its
overwhelming advantage in numbers, the United States never systematically pursued such a policy. Higher officials in Washington
rarely conceived of Indian-white relations in terms of the cooperation the Spanish practiced. But the frontier military and some
frontiersmen found such cooperation useful and sometimes indispensable. 32
Other considerations than military defense and the desires of the
Indians usually dictated the location of reservations in the United
States. Nevertheless, reservations sometimes served as defensive
salients. Jacksonian Indian policy intended, by removing eastern
tribes west of the Mississippi, to open the vacated lands to white
settlement and also to protect Indians from degeneration and
annihilation. All the same, the "Civilized Tribes" acted as a buffer
between Arkansas and Missouri and the "wild tribes" of the
Plains. The transplanted tribes suffered, but they proved capable
of holding their new lands. When the federal government assigned
the Wyoming Shoshonis a reservation in the Wind River valley in
1868, nearby mining communities were pleased; they expected the
Shoshonis to serve as protection from attacks by Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahos. This does not seem to have been the primary
consideration, but it was in the mind of General C. C. Augur, who
negotiated the settlement with the tribe. Settlers in western Montana welcomed the Crows as a buffer between them and the Sioux
in the 1860s and '70s. Later, when Sitting Bull's diehards were
making forays from Canada, whites were thankful that the reservation of the once-dreaded Blackfeet stood as a barrier to the
raiders. The adage that the only good Indian was a dead one did
not apply in this instance, and the Blackfeet began to enjoy a more
desirable status. 33
A military "colony" of a different sort existed when a group of
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Indians became dependents and adjuncts of a military post. These
instances occurred, not because they were dictated by high-level
policy, but from happenstance and expediency. Fort Apache in
Arizona came into existence because bands of White Mountain
Apaches asked for peace, and the military department commander seized the opportunity to provide protection and supervision. Some of these bands insisted on remaining in the area, their
traditional homeland, rather than moving to the San Carlos reservation. The army aided and abetted them, keeping many of the
men on the rolls as scouts. The army also encouraged Indians to
farm and bought some of their produce, to the distress of would-be
white contractors. 34
Somewhat similar relations developed between the army and
the Tonkawas at Fort Griffin, Texas; the Northern Cheyennes at
Fort Keogh, Montana; the Seminole-Negroes (exemplary Indian
scouts of mixed ancestry) at Fort Duncan, Texas; and the Hidatsas
at Fort Buford, Dakota Territory. Bands of Indians were permanently established near a fort, the men regularly re-enlisted as
scouts, and to some extent the whole band under military discipline. Each of these military "colonies" originated as a temporary
expedient to secure the services of the Indians and to protect them
from Indian and white enemies. Yet each, except with the Hidatsas, lasted for a decade or more. 35
All these instances had a precedent iII: Spanish policy in the later
eighteenth century. Military posts in the borderlands had in some
cases replaced missions as centers of settlement for pacified Indians, who then served as auxiliaries. In Sonora in the 1780s two
presidios were manned entirely by Opatas and one by Pimas,
probably with at least one white officer. Though Indians were important auxiliaries on the western American frontier, they were
never given such important roles in the United States. 36
Such military-Indian relations were often unacceptable to
secular and religious authorities who saw the Indians as their responsibility. Kipling's observation that "single men in barricks
[sic]" were not missionary material reinforced theviews of Spanish padres and Anglo-American agents and missionaries, who
were sure that Indians' morals would suffer from association with
soldiers. On the other hand, soldiers usually did not encourage as-
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similation with Indians as fervently as missionaries and secular
humanitarians, though they could accept gradual change and thus
were often more congenial to the Indians. Comparisons between
the Catholic Church of colonial Spain and the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs should not be carried too far, but it is notable that in
the 1870s President Grant virtually turned,the Bureau over to Protestant churches. Conflicts of authority occurred in both instances, and both Church and Bureau instituted perhaps more
authoritarian control over the Indians than the military. Both institutions intended to integrate Indians into the larger community
as replicas of what the dominant society considered to be a model
Christian citizen. 37
A number of similarities existed, then, between the military service of Indians and Indian-military relations on the Spanish and
United States frontiers. Yet it is difficult to establish any clear continuity of practice between the two. In the Southwest, Pueblos and
other Indians may have informed U.S. authorities after 1848 that
they were willing to serve as they had in the past, but these same
patterns appeared in regions and among people who had never
had significant contact with the Spanish. In any case, the AngloAmerican military rarely evinced any great respect for Spanish or
Mexican military prowess. If they adopted any of the practices of
their predecessors, knowingly or otherwise, it was surely because
they found these practices clearly expedient, or even unavoidable.
Clearly, similar conditions and needs existed on the two frontiers and forced suitable adaptations on pragmatic soldiers and Indian chiefs. Like most commanders, Spanish and U.S. military
leaders never thought that they had adequate numbers of men,
arms, and supplies; instead, they wanted to bolster their manpower and to enhance the effectiveness of their forces. On both
frontiers were vast expanses of rugged territory familiar to Indians
but unknown wasteland to white pioneers. Even if one grants
the importance of the great technological advantages the U.S.
possessed, notably the railroad and telegraph, these inventions
touched only limited parts of the West before the end of the Indian
wars. The Indians were adapted to their country as their opponents were not; both armies made some attempt to devise tactics
and equipment suited to the conditions, but with only partial suc-
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cess. The Indians learned skills for war and survival in childhood,
skills that regular troops did not possess. While Spanish-Mexican
presidiales were likely better acquainted with the conditions and
the necessities of their frontier than their U.S. Army counterparts,
they were still a few men in a vast and hostile land.
Among the Indians there were also numerous, roughly comparable, conditions. Notably, tribal divisions and other animosities existed that whites could exploit. Many groups of Indians
were in such need of allies that the white military forces appeared
. virtually as saviors-rather inept saviors, at times. In addition, as
they perceived the potential of whites, Indian leaders naturally
hoped to ingratiate themselves with t}:1is new force. They wanted
to gain privileges and favors, including exemptions from the misfortunes that might befall those who resisted. Those who had
experienced defeat, or at least enough harassment to make accom. modation appear desirable, could also salve their pride by demonstrating that they were respected by the conquerors and were still
fighting men. Acquisition of the white man's weapons was no
small inducement in many cases. Glory and loot were both available to men of warrior societies who had been taught to want'
them. Some Indian leaders undoubtedly sought to enhance their
power within their society, at the expense of more dogged resisters. At the same time, many chiefs must have seen such: cooperation as the best option in difficult and changing times-a way
of preserving the lives and welfare of those for whom they were responsible and to whom they owed their first loyalty.
Other differences, such as demographic, cultural, and technological factors, caused dissimilarities between the two governments in regard to Indian allies. In the United States, large
numbers of white settlers faced relatively small numbers of Indians. In 1757, after a century and a half of Spanish colonization,
Pueblos still outnumbered Spanish settlers in New Mexico by
nearly three to two. Though surpassed in numbers, the Spanish
formed a series of Indian-white alliances that allowed them to
dominate the Indians and to increase Spanish settlement. 38
The United States, on the other hand, was not forced to integrate Indians into a dominant society; it had the strength to sweep
them aside and concern itself only with outbreaks of resistance

..,.~

:

".1

;,>1.,,,:.

. ','~' ·~I:

NEW MEXICO HISTORICAL REVIEW 56:3 1981

254

that could always be defeated. Assimilation was an ideal, but not a
necessity. Greater resources in manpower and technology allowed
the United States frontier to grow without Indian labor; the land,
rather than the people, would be appropriated. Because of this difference, Anglo-Americans from colonial times on showed far less
interest in assimilation than the Spanish.
In spite of all these advantages and all the differences in official
structure and policy, the United States Army adopted many Spanish practices in dealing with Indians. They armed the Indians, integrated them into the military force, rewarded them to the extent
that law and official policy made possible, protected their homes
and families against other Indians, used them as intelligence
agents and go-betweens, and even attached bands to military posts
as symbiotic military colonies. They made use of Indian intertribal and intratribal enmities and were in turn used by Indians in
these struggles and as counterweights to civil and religious authorities.
In short, in dealing with Indians the U.S. Army used methods
that the Spanish had found effective and necessary. Put another
way, perhaps the Indians forced the Spanish and Americans to
these solutions. The difference may be only one of emphasis.
Clearly, soldiers of European heritage and tradition, confronted
with common difficulties, turned to similar methods. If these
military groups tended to think alike, they displayed an adaptability at odds with popular stereotypes. Finally, if the Indians in
both instances adapted to changing circumstance in like ways,
they too should be given credit for an adaptability that misconceptions have often denied them.
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CONTEST NEWS

CALVIN HORN SCHOLARSHIP WINNERS FOR

1981

Winners in the 1981 contest were announced recently. They were Eric
Diehl, a junior at Robertson High School, Las Vegas, whose essay was
"Valmora: Tonic for Tuberculosis," and Marietta Marmon, a junior at
Rehoboth Christian School, Rehoboth, whose entry was entitled "The
Uranium Industry in New Mexico: Its Impact on the Social Structure of .
the Laguna Pueblo." The other winner was Linda Duncan of Dora High
School, Dora, with "New Mexico's Renowned 200th Coast Artillery
Anti-Aircraft." She will attend Eastern New Mexico University at Portales in the fall. Teachers of the winners were Randall Gaylor of Robertson High, Pat Thatcher of Dora High, and Ruth Posthuma of Rehoboth
Christian.

HISTORY DAY WINNERS
After regional contests in Silver City and Hobbs, history students and
teachers from around the state traveled to UNM on 4 April for the second annual National History Day state finals. Sponsored by the New
Mexico Council of the Social Studies, UNM, and the National Endowment for the Humanities, the contest selected "Work and Leisure in
History" as this year's theme. First place winning entries were Sandia
High School, Albuquerque, senior group performance; Dugan-Tarango
Mid School, Lordsburg, junior group performance; Gallup High School,
senior group project; Dugan-Tarango Mid School, junior group project.
In the individual categories, Ronald Clure of Houston Junior High,
Hobbs, won for senior project, and Mignon Sasa of Stout Mid School,
Silver City, won for the junior project. The winning senior paper was by
Marietta Marmon of Rehoboth Christian School, Rehoboth, and the
junior paper was by Elena Patten of Grant Mid School, Albuquerque. Instructors of the winners were Doug Blech (Sandia High), Mollie Pressler
and John Woodard (Dugan-Tarango Mid School), Sally Noe (Gallup
High), Tony Baker (Houston Junior High), Tom Edminster (Stout Mid
School), Stan Pikaart (Rehoboth Christian School), and Frank Davis
(Grant Mid School). Next year's theme is "Trade and Industry in
History." For information contact Lynn Oshima, Mesa Vista Hall 3033,
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, 87131.

PUBLICATION NOTICES

The Center for Land Grant Studies, a nonprofit research organization
in Santa Fe, has just released its first publication: The Tierra Amarilla
Grant: A History of Chicanery, by Malcolm Ebright. This eighty-page
book is the early history of the grant and of its adjudication. It contains
many illustrations (photos of the villages and of the original grant
documents), a foreword by Frank Waters, and a list of the first settlers of
the Tierra Amarilla. The book may be purchased for $6.50 from The
Center for Land Grant Studies, 136 Grant Avenue, Santa Fe, New Mexico 87501.
Spanish and Mexican Land Grants in New Mexico and Colorado, edited by John R. and Christine M. Van Ness, is now available from
Sunflower University Press (Box 1009, Manhattan, Kansas 66502) for
$8.00. It contains ten articles focusing on specific land grants. Illustrations include maps, photographs, and sketches.
An interdisciplinary approach to the energy issue, particularly as it
confronts residents of the Southwest, appeared in the Summer 1980 issue
of New America. Copies are available from New America, c/o Department of American Studies, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque,
New Mexico 87131, for $4.00.
A commemorative scrapbook of Gallup's centennial celebration
(1881-1981) may be ordered from The Independent, 103 W. Aztec,
Gallup, New Mexico. Copies are fifty cents.

Early Albuquerque: A Photographic History 1870-1918 has recently
been published as a joint project of the Albuquerque Journal and the
Albuquerque Museum. The museum's curator of history, Byron A. Johnson, edited the book with Robert K. Dauner, photoarchivist of the
museum. The 272-page volume contains 320 photographs of Albuquerque locations, citizens, and events. It is available at the Museum, at
bookstores, and at three locations of the Albuquerque Publishing Company (717 Silver SW and 145 Quincy NE, Albuquerque, or the Santa Fe
Bureau, 300 Galisteo, Santa Fe). The price is $18.50 (soft-cover) or
$25.00 (cloth).

